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In this paper, we take a closer look at the promotion of social inclusion in the framework
of the Europe 2020 strategy, in particular the legal consequences of the incorporation of
the social inclusion guidelines under the European Semester. Since the employment
guidelines under the Europe 2020 strategy are now connected in a structural way to the
economic guidelines, we ﬁrst look at the monitoring procedures that accompany the
implementation of these economic guidelines. Furthermore, we test the potential legal
consequences of the integrated approach by unravelling (the formulation of) the social
inclusion-related Country Speciﬁc Recommendations, and look at to what extent they
answer to the economic, employment or social inclusion objectives.
The ﬁrst legal consequence relates to the question of whether and to what extent the
harder sanctioning tools, which have been developed for controlling the EU’s economic-
oriented Country Speciﬁc Recommendations, can be similarly applied to the guidelines
relating to social inclusion (such as the application of sanctions in cases when the
recommendations are not followed by states). In our opinion, there is a spillover effect
only in relation to social inclusion recommendations that have sufﬁcient economic or
budgetary relevance (‘social inclusion recommendations of the negative kind’, supporting
economic or budgetary goals). In other words, social inclusion recommendations that
support only social objectives (or only employment objectives) do not enjoy the stronger
legal effects of the integrated monitoring approach.
From analysing the concrete Country Speciﬁc Recommendations, we demonstrate that
the incorporation of social inclusion into the employment guidelines has two additional
consequences. On the one hand, social inclusion recommendations are nowadays for-
mulated mainly in terms of employment objectives. On the other hand, the link with
social inclusion also has implications for recommendations in the ﬁeld of employment
and economy that should not be to the detriment of social inclusion
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With the Europe 2020 strategy, the European ﬁght against social exclusion was given fresh impetus. In contrast with the
Lisbon strategy, the objective of promoting social inclusion has been closely tied up with the employment and economic
monitoring policies. Concretely, ten integrated guidelines for implementing the Europe 2020 strategy have been adopted:
six broad guidelines for the economic policies of the member states and the EU, and four guidelines for employment
policies. The guideline on social inclusion is the last of the employment guidelines.2
In this contribution, we ﬁrst assess whether and to what extent, this new approach of incorporating social inclusion into
the economic and employment guidelines has legal consequences. In particular, we try to answer following research
question: Can we consider the new social monitoring strategy developed within the Europe 2020 strategy as a step forward
from the previous social OMC, as applied in the Lisbon Strategy, when it comes to (legal) enforceability? In other words, we
address the question of whether the decisions and recommendations that derive from the social inclusion guideline enjoy
stronger enforceability than those of the past, when social inclusion was an integral part of the (non-legal) policy coordi-
nation method as established by the Social Policy Chapter in the TFEU (better known under the acronym OMC – Open
Method of Co-ordination). In order to do so, we apply the new EU socio-economic governance framework to a sample of
Country Speciﬁc Recommendations enacted by the Council during the last four years within the economic monitoring
process of the EU. The sample is chosen on the basis of their relevance for social inclusion.
In that way, this contribution builds upon previous research done by the authors (Schoukens, 2013) and (Schoukens and
Beke Smets, 2014), but also on other (previous) research, such as Armstrong (2010), Bekker (2014), Cantillon, Verschueren,
and Ploscar (2012) in which, respectively, an overview has been provided of the current social inclusion recommendations
and an analysis of to what extent these recommendations changed in nature under the Europe 2020 strategy (2010–2020)
compared to the previous Lisbon strategy (2000–2010). In a similar way to the previous publication (Schoukens and Beke
Smets, 2014), we categorise the Country Speciﬁc (social inclusion) Recommendations, taking into account the speciﬁc
objectives they pursue. By addressing the legal consequences of the recent incorporation of social inclusion into the
employment economic monitoring guidelines, this contribution differs from other papers on this topic which mainly focus
on the governance structures and the institutional arrangements underlying the EU socio-economic monitoring of the
Europe 2020 strategy.3
This paper will not provide an overview of the Memoranda of Understanding and the ﬁnancial assistance measures.
Although here as well, we see that the ﬁnancial assistance measures and the conditions attached to receiving loans entailed
several drastic social policy reforms, they are not part of the European Semester. Furthermore, these ﬁnancial assistance
measures have already received large scholarly attention (Kilpatrick and De Witte, 2014; Schoukens, De Becker and Beke
Smets, 2014).
Before looking at a sample of the Country Speciﬁc Recommendations, we ﬁrst provide an overview of the present
competences in the ﬁeld of social inclusion4 that are to be found within the Chapter on Social Policy in the TFEU5. This
overview will then be followed by a legal assessment of the new approach where social inclusion is embedded in the
employment and economic monitoring processes of the European Union (Article 121, resp. 148 TFEU). In doing so, we take
the relevant treaty provisions into account, as well as secondary legislation and regulatory documents and the relevant
literature. For the sample of the Country Speciﬁc Recommendations, we looked at the recommendations of 2015, 2014, 2013
and 2012, and the EU documents relevant in this regard.62. Promoting social inclusion (within the EU Social Policy Chapter)
The main competences in the promotion of social inclusion are to be found in Title X TFEU (Social Policy Chapter). This
title groups together the competences of the EU in the ﬁeld of social policy. In it, reference is made to social inclusion in two
ways: as a (social) objective and as a ground for competence.
As to the objectives, Article 151 TFEU explicitly refers to the combatting of social exclusion. As European objectives
provide the framework within which the concrete competences of the EU can be applied, they are crucial for the devel-
opment of European (legal) measures.7 The EU can thus only make use of its powers if it positions its actions in terms of the2 Since 2010 the following integrated employment guidelines have been approved by the council: (1) increasing labour market participation and
reducing structural unemployment, (1) developing a skilled workforce responding to labour market needs, (2) promoting job quality and lifelong learning,
(3) improving the performance of education and training systems at all levels and increasing participation in tertiary education and (4) promoting social
inclusion and combatting poverty. For more information about the integrated guidelines see: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employ-
ment_and_social_policy/eu2020/em0028_en.htm:
3 See for example the work of J. Zeitlin and B. Vanhercke (2014).
4 In this paper, we refer systematically to the promotion of social inclusion in line with the integrated EU guidelines. Occasionally, reference will be
made to the combatting of (social) exclusion. For the purpose of this contribution, both concepts are interchangeable and no legal value has been attributed
to the distinction.
5 Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.
6 The Country Speciﬁc recommendations are available online, see the European Commission website.
7 Art. 5 (1) TEU.
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of social inclusion – on their own merits, without referring to economic objectives, e.g. for the implementation of the
internal market.9
Article 153 TFEU speciﬁes a number of matters on which European institutions (in principle on the basis of a joint action
by the Council and the European Parliament) can take action. Among them we ﬁnd a reference to the combatting of social
exclusion, allowing the EU institutions to take non-legislative measures in this ﬁeld. Moreover, one should not forget that
the EU only has a supportive competence in the area of social policy; member states still maintain the (primary) competence
to organise their own social (security) systems.
As the promotion of social inclusion is not listed in the ﬁelds for which the EU can take legal measures10, the EU can only
achieve the objectives of social inclusion through non-legal cooperation.11 Furthermore, this technique of policy coordi-
nation may not lead to any harmonisation of the laws and the regulations of the member states.12 Finally, Article 153 TFEU
also restricts the scope of envisaged action with regard to the effect social inclusion measures may have. Measures taken on
the basis of Article 153 TFEU, whether of a legal or co-operative nature, must not affect the right of member states to deﬁne
the fundamental principles of their own social security system and must not signiﬁcantly affect the ﬁnancial equilibrium
thereof.13 The mandate to promote social inclusion has thus been kept rather restricted within the Social Policy Chapter: no
legal action can be taken, and the action that is taken on the basis of Article 153 TFEU must not signiﬁcantly affect the
national social security systems.14
Within the ambit of the Lisbon Strategy, launched by the European Council in March 2010, the method of non-legal
cooperation to promote social inclusion was made concrete through the open method of coordination (OMC; see also
below). The OMC on social inclusion led to a vast machinery relating to objective setting and the measurement of poverty
and social exclusion in the member states, as well as a close monitoring of national policies. Concrete guidelines were ﬁxed,
combined with speciﬁc timetables for achieving goals set in the short, medium and long term for the member states.
Appropriate quantitative and qualitative indicators, as well as benchmarks – tailored to the needs of the different member
states and sectors – were developed as a means of comparing best practices.15 Furthermore, the European guidelines were
translated into national and regional policies by setting speciﬁc targets and measures, accounting for national and regional
differences. Finally, the whole procedure was to be governed by a periodic monitoring, involving systematic evaluation and
peer review. All these concrete elements contributed to an envisaged mutual learning process in relation to the promotion
of social inclusion.16
Whether the OMC on social inclusion is to be considered a success, apart from this outcome, will not be addressed in this
paper. Others have commented extensively on the pros and cons of the applied policy monitoring process.17 Probably the
most valuable outcome of this process, apart from the fact that it guaranteed a high level debate on combatting poverty in
Europe, has been the development of concrete tools (indicators) which provide a common standard for the measurement of
poverty and social exclusion across the member states of the EU. At least one shortcoming, namely that national poverty
ﬁgures were not comparable, as the underlying methodology diverged (too much) between states, was countered.
Whatever the outcome may have been, the fact is that in 2010, the EU launched a new ten-year programme labelled ‘the
Europe 2020 strategy’ on the basis of the results of the Lisbon Strategy (EU Commission COM, 2010). As part of this strategy,
the EU monitoring process was revived in a new setting in which the applied methodology of policy monitoring changed.
The promotion of social inclusion has thus been integrated as a guideline within the broader economic and employment
monitoring process. By doing so, the ﬁeld of action shifted from the Social Policy Chapter to the Economic and Employment
Chapters of the TFEU, giving some leeway for more enforceable action. Before we go into an analysis of this new approach,
we ﬁrst have to explain the employment and economic monitoring process as conducted by the EU, its legal basis, and the
mandate to apply and enforce the Country Speciﬁc Recommendations in the member states.3. Promoting social inclusion as an employment guideline
The Lisbon Strategy was formally concluded in June 2010 with the adoption by the Council of the new Europe 2020
Strategy, in which the Council agreed to the European Commission’s proposal (March 2010) to launch a new strategy for jobs
and growth (Council Recommendation, 11646/2010a). This new Strategy is based on enhanced socio-economic policy
coordination and is organised to achieve three priorities that are expected to be mutually reinforcing: smart growth, sus-
tainable growth and inclusive growth. The third priority is about fostering a high-employment economy delivering social8 Art. 5 (1) TEU. For more information about functional competences, see (Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, 2011, p. 106).
9 See also Art. 3 (3) TEU for additional social objectives.
10 Article 153, § 2, sub b TFEU.
11 Article 153, § 2, sub a TFEU.
12 Article 153, § 2, sub a TFEU.
13 Article 153, § 4 TFEU.
14 For a similar argument, see Verschueren (2012, p. 214).
15 For an overview of the social inclusion indicators used in the past, see (Inclusion Indicators, 2008).
16 For an overview, see Schoukens (2002) and for more extended accounts: Natali (2010) and Daly (2010).
17 For an overview, see: Vanhercke (2011) and Armstrong, 2010).
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and modernising labour markets, training and social protection systems so as to help people anticipate and manage change,
and build a cohesive society. In that regard, the EU has (as one of its objectives) to bring at least 20 million people out of
poverty and social exclusion by 2020.18
The Council adopted 10 integrated guidelines to implement the Europe 2020 strategy: six broad guidelines for the
economic policies (Council Recommendation, 2010b/410/EU, 2010) of the member states and four guidelines for the
employment policies (Council Decision No. 2010/707/EU, 2010) of the member states. In the tenth guideline, reference is
made to the social policies of the member states with regard to social inclusion: states should promote social inclusion and
aim their policies at combatting poverty. No explicit reference in the guidelines whatsoever is made to the modernisation of
social protection systems, although this was considered to be a crucial element in the development of inclusive growth
under the previous Lisbon strategy.19
The integrated guidelines have been adopted on the basis of Article 121 TFEU (part of the Economic Policy Chapter) and
Article 148 TFEU (part of the Employment Chapter). Consequently, the tenth guideline, which deals with social inclusion, is
not based on Article 153 TFEU, as it has been integrated into the four employment guidelines which have their legal basis in
the Employment Chapter of the Treaty (i.e. Article 148 TFEU). This guideline aims directly at promoting social inclusion and
combatting poverty. It suggests that these goals can be reached by employment measures such as promoting labour market
participation.
By including the social inclusion guideline in the employment guidelines under the Europe 2020 strategy, this guideline
is no longer part of a separate social OMC, like under the Lisbon strategy. This is also demonstrated by the annex to the
guidelines for the employment policies of the member states which states that:18
19
fully d
encour
20
21“equally, to ﬁght social exclusion, empower people and promote labour market participation, social protection sys-
tems, lifelong learning and active inclusion policies should be enhanced to create opportunities at different states of
people’s lives and shield them from the risk of exclusion” (Annex to the Council Decision No. 2010/707/EEU, 2010).Social inclusion is thus explicitly intertwined with the employment and economic guidelines, where under the original
Lisbon strategy, the Social OMC was a separate policy coordination mechanism. We now brieﬂy introduce the Employment
Chapter of the TFEU, and follow this with an explanation of the integrated EU monitoring of economic and employment
policies.
3.1. Monitoring employment polices (employment chapter TFEU)
Due to structural unemployment levels in Europe, employment has been high on the agenda of the EU for some time
now. Nevertheless, Article 146 TFEU emphasises that employment policy is ﬁrst and foremost a matter to be dealt with by
member states. They should, however, co-operate according to the provisions of Article 148 TFEU:
1. The European Council shall each year consider the employment situation in the Union and adopt conclusions thereon, on
the basis of a joint annual report by the Council and the Commission.
2. On the basis of the conclusions of the European Council, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament, shall each year draw up guidelines which the member states shall take into account
in their employment policies. These guidelines shall be consistent with the broad guidelines adopted pursuant to Article
121 (2) TFEU.20
The ‘guidelines’ to be adopted by the Council do not have any legally binding force. However, this does not mean that
measures to promote cooperation between member states are either useless or superﬂuous. The procedure under Article
148 TFEU has been further developed with the Europe 2020 strategy and the European Semester. In that respect, the
guidelines to be adopted by the Council are the Country Speciﬁc Recommendations under the European Semester (see
further below).
Furthermore, Article 149 TFEU allows the Council to take incentive measures21 in order to encourage co-operation
between member states and to support their action in the ﬁeld of employment. This should be done through initiatives
aimed at developing exchanges of information and best practices, providing comparative analysis and advice as well as
promoting innovative approaches and evaluating experiences, in particular by recourse to pilot projects. Although these
measures go beyond mere advice, the minimal role of the EU in correcting national policies is conﬁrmed in this Article. The
measures under the Employment Chapter may not lead to any kind of legal harmonisation whatsoever.Compare with the objective under the Lisbon strategy where reference was made to the eradication of poverty by 2010.
See however, the annex regarding guidelines 10: “Social protection systems, including pensions and access to healthcare, should be modernised and
eployed to ensure adequate income support and services — thus providing social cohesion — whilst remaining ﬁnancially sustainable and
aging participation in society and in the labour market” see Annex to the Council Decision No. 2010/707/EU.
Concrete reference is made to the economic guidelines of Article 121 TFEU; see more about this below.
For more information about these measures, see Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (2011).
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guidelines with benchmarks, as well as a reporting procedure by the member states on the implementation of their
employment policies in relation to these guidelines. We see that these guidelines provide a rather wide margin for adap-
tation at national level. Still, the fact that more quantitative indicators and benchmarks are progressively being introduced
puts more pressure on the member states. The Employment Committee has so far played an important role in setting out
priorities, objectives, and recommendations. As the employment guidelines are not legally enforceable, at least when
exclusively based upon Article 148 TFEU, sanctions are limited to peer pressure and public opinion. Since 2010, however, the
linkage with the economic guidelines under the Europe 2020 strategy has opened up some new perspectives on the legal
enforceability of the employment guidelines (Council Decision No. 2010/707/EU). In the second part of this chapter, we will
look further into the economic monitoring process, as well as the possibility to sanction member states.
3.2. The employment guidelines integrated in the economic monitoring process
3.2.1. The Europe 2020 strategy: towards an integrated monitoring procedure
In 2005, the European Council (Brussels – 22 and 23 March) adopted its presidency conclusions on “Improving the
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact” (European Council Presidency Conclusions, 2005). In these conclusions,
the European Council announced a structural interconnection between the employment and economic guidelines. In other
words, the European Council recommended a more structural incorporation of employment (policies) into the European
economic monitoring process.
At the same time, facing the ﬁnancial and the subsequent economic global crisis, the EU started to exercise its com-
petences to control the national economies and ﬁscal policies of member states more extensively. Ever since the intro-
duction of the single currency, the EU’s main ambition has been to contain public deﬁcit and public debts. Crucial in this
respect is the avoidance of deﬁcits and macroeconomic imbalances, and the duty to guarantee ﬁnancial stability by a strong
coordination of national economic policies. With that end in mind, the EU redesigned its (operating) procedures for
monitoring national economies and its stability pack that guaranteed the stable introduction of the single currency (euro).
Next to these control procedures, which were mainly of a preventive nature, it introduced reparation programmes (ﬁnancial
assistance measures) in order to (ﬁnancially) support member states that had already faced serious budgetary problems.
The EU strategy for controlling the economies and ﬁscal policies of the member states has developed into a complicated
set of monitoring procedures. For the purpose of this paper, we mainly focus on programmes of a preventive nature for
developing recommendations to member states to keep their economies competitive. In these programmes, the employ-
ment monitoring procedure has been integrated, as well as the promotion of social inclusion and is thus closely intertwined
with economic coordination programmes.
In so far as they are not relevant for social inclusion, less attention will go to budgetary programmes which have mainly
been developed with the purpose of maintaining stability during the introduction of the single currency (euro). Similarly,
we do not focus here on curative programmes (such as the European Stability Mechanism – ESM) (Treaty, 2011) that provide
ﬁnancial support22 — in some instances in conjunction with other international organisations — to member states facing
serious public debts.
We ﬁrst explain the basic structure of the monitoring process (European Semester), identify where integration between
employment and economic monitoring takes place, and ﬁnally highlight the possible legal effects for the enforceability of
this integrated approach for the tenth guideline on social inclusion.
3.2.2. The European semester
Economic monitoring takes place in a systematic manner through the ‘European Semester’, during which member states’
budgetary and employment policies are examined. The European Semester starts each year in March when the European
Council identiﬁes the main (economic) challenges on the basis of the European Commission’s Survey on Annual Growth
(AGS). After the identiﬁcation of the main economic and social challenges for the member states, the Council gives strategic
advice on their national policies on the basis of the AGS. On the basis of this advice, each member state has to draw up two
different programmes and send them to the Commission by the end of April:
- A national reform programme, setting out the actions and policy measures that it will undertake in areas such as eco-
nomic policy, but also national employment and social inclusion policies.
- A stability and convergence programme, related to multiannual budget planning.
After an assessment of the programmes, the Commission adopts the Country Speciﬁc Recommendations in May, before
the member states draw up their ﬁnal budget plans for the following year. These recommendations are a quasi tailor-made
advice on deeper reforms for the individual member states and do not only focus on economic measures or reforms, but also
consist of measures relating to employment and social inclusion. These recommendations are endorsed by the Council
in June.22 For more information about these curative programmes, see Lenaerts (2013).
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the ‘European Two-Pack’,23 which encompasses a stricter budgetary monitoring system. The Two-Pack, based on Article 136
TFEU, complements the preventive and corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP – the legal framework for the
coordination of ﬁscal policies in the EU) and aims at further strengthening the surveillance mechanisms for the member
states of the Eurozone. Furthermore, the ‘European Two-Pack’, which entered into force on 30 May 2013, introduces sim-
pliﬁed rules for the surveillance of member states that are facing ﬁnancial difﬁculties, as well as simpliﬁed rules for the
surveillance of ﬁnancial assistance programmes for member states who have already received ﬁnancial assistance.
The Two-Pack tries to improve budgetary coordination by introducing a common budgetary timeline and budgetary rules
for the member states of the Eurozone and is structured in the following way: the member states submit a draft budgetary
plan to the Commission and the Eurogroup each year before 15 October. The Commission subsequently adopts an opinion on
these draft budgets before 30 November. When these draft budgets do not comply with the obligations set forth in the SGP,
the member state has to submit a revised budgetary plan. In this way, the Two-Pack also complements the preventive arm
of the SGP (Lenaerts, 2013, p. 6).
The ofﬁcial budget laws of the member states are then adopted and made public no later than 31 December. Finally, the
member states make their medium-term ﬁscal plans public, no later than 15 April of the following calendar year. If the
Commission observes severe non-compliance with the obligations set out in the SGP,24 it will ask the member state con-
cerned to submit a revised draft budgetary plan. Eurozone member states with serious difﬁculties will be subject to
enhanced surveillance, as well as countries receiving certain types of ﬁnancial assistance (Regulation No. 472/2013, Article 1
1 a) and b)). Surveillance involves an obligation for the member states to address the sources of the instability. These
member states will, moreover, be subjected to regular review.
3.2.2.2. The Macro-Economic Imbalance Procedure. In 2011, the EU adopted six additional measures to the European Semester
(the so-called Six-Pack) to strengthen the ﬁscal discipline of the member states and to organise ﬁscal and macro-economic
surveillance within the EU. Four of the six measures apply to all member states (Regulation No. 1175/2011; Regulation No.
1176/2011; Regulation No. 1177/2011; Directive No. 2011/85/EU), while two, which deﬁne possible sanctions, only apply to
Eurozone member states (Regulation 1173/2011; Regulation 1174/2011).
One part of the Six-Pack – the Macro-Economic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) (Regulation No. 1173/2011; Regulation No.
1174/2011) – is of particular relevance, as it can be seen as a concrete application of the integrated monitoring approach. On
the basis of the MIP, a procedure was established that enables the Commission to monitor the macro-economic policies of
the member states on the basis of pre-deﬁned indicators. One of the indicators signalling a possible macro-economic
imbalance is related to unemployment.
By using a scoreboard that incorporates a set of indicators, the Commission can check whether a member state
(potentially) faces macro-economic imbalances. If so, the Commission can insist that the member state take corrective
measures. The measures proposed by the Commission are reviewed by the Council. If necessary, the Council can propose
concrete recommendations. In the event that the member states does not act upon the recommendation(s), a deposit can be
demanded or a ﬁne can be imposed (see further below) (Regulation No. 1174/2011, Article 3).
In its list of indicators to monitor the macro-economic situation of these member states, the Commission also takes into
account the ‘3-year backward moving average of the unemployment rate, with a threshold of 10%’ (MIP Scoreboard). An
excessively high structural unemployment rate is thus considered to be an indicator of an unbalanced macro-economic
climate. As a result, national measures that tend to increase unemployment rates are closely monitored and can be made
subject to recommendations for change. When such recommendations referring to the reduction of the unemployment rate
are not followed by a Eurozone member state25, sanctions can potentially be applied (see below). Yet, the underlying goal is
of relevance: long term unemployment is addressed and monitored closely, in so far as it may cause an unbalance regarding
the macro-economic climate in a member state. That way, the monitoring of social objectives (e.g. reduction of unem-
ployment) ultimately supports economic objectives. Combatting unemployment for the sake of increasing employment or,
more generally, social cohesion is not the ﬁrst priority here.
No reference was made (initially) in the list of indicators to social inclusion, but this has changed since the Commission
proposed to add four additional auxiliary indicators to the MIP scoreboard in order to track employment and social pro-
blems in a more consistent way within the framework of the European Semester (EU Commission COM, 690, 2 October
2013). The following social indicators are used in the MIP as of 2014:
- the participation rate,
- the long-term unemployment ratio,23 The European Two-Pack consists of two regulations, both entered into force on May 30th 2013: (1) Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of
excessive deﬁcit of the Member states in the euro area, and (2) Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013
on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member states in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difﬁculties with
respect to their ﬁnancial stability.
24 The legal framework for the coordination of national ﬁscal policies in the European Union.
25 As, e.g. the ones formulated for Belgium: Council Recommendation No. 11244/12.
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or training),
- the at risk of poverty and social exclusion rate, complemented by three sub-indicators:
 the at risk of poverty rate,
 the severe material deprivation rate,
 the proportion of persons living in households with low work intensity.
The social (inclusion) indicators stem from the OMC-monitoring process (see Chapter 2) developed to assess (national)
progress in the ﬁght against social exclusion. This means that the national social inclusion policies are now monitored more
in-depth through the MIP as well.
According to the Commission, the incorporation of social indicators would allow a better understanding of the risks of
such imbalances in terms of unemployment, poverty and wider social consequences. It would also contribute to a better
understanding of social developments (EU Commission COM, 2013). With regard to the exact role of these social indicators
in the MIP, the discussions at the February 2014 ECOFIN Council were of particular interest (Council, 2014). The Council
emphasised that the use of auxiliary social indicators will have the sole purpose of allowing a broader understanding of
social developments, but that the nature of the MIP should be carefully preserved.
The indicators are thus useful to map the social consequences of the MIP, but they are apparently not meant to constitute
indicators to establish macro-economic imbalances. In that regard, it is doubtful whether the EU is competent at all to introduce
additional (auxiliary) social indicators in the MIP, as this procedure is based on the current Article 121 (6) TFEU and only allows
the Union to take action in the domain of the member states’ economic policy, and not in the domain of social policy.
From the monetary reports (i.e. the Alert Mechanism Report of 2013 and the in-depth reviews of 2014), we can learn that no
speciﬁc concrete thresholds have been developed which member states have to meet for these auxiliary (social) indicators. Thus,
it remains to be seen whether a more prominent position is considered for these auxiliary indicators in the future.263.2.2.3. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. The Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (the TSCG) was signed on 2 March 2012 and signed by
all member states, except for the United Kingdom and Croatia.27 The main goal of the TSCG is to implement, in the context of
the recent ﬁnancial crisis, a balanced budget rule in national legislation which builds further on the rules of the European
Stability and Growth Pact.
The TSCG is organised around four pillars: (1) limiting deﬁcits, (2) an automatic correction mechanism, (3) reinforced
coordination and (4) speciﬁc euro summit meetings. In the third pillar, the contracting states agree to work jointly towards
an economic policy that fosters the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union and economic growth through
enhanced convergence and competitiveness. In that respect, again, a speciﬁc reference is made to the objective of the
promotion of employment (TSCG, Article 9).3.2.2.4. Surveillance and enforcement. The regulatory framework shaping the multilateral surveillance mechanisms for the
coordination of the economic policies foresees some possibilities for imposing ﬁnes when member states do not follow up
on the recommendations of the Council. The EU already had the competence to request deposits from member states when
their budgets failed to reach predeﬁned levels, e.g. in relation to the SGP. With the introduction of the European Six-Pack,
the Union was given additional competences to sanction member states of the Eurozone in cases of economic non-
conformity. These competences are mainly derived from the MIP, which was introduced in 2011 alongside the European
Semester system (Regulation 1176/2011).
The supervisory mechanism as originally developed in Regulation 1466/97 (1997) sets out the sanctions that may be
imposed when the Country Speciﬁc Recommendations have not been implemented in the year following the European
Semester timeframe. Failure by a member state to act upon the guidance received may result in further recommendations to
take speciﬁc measures (a), a warning by the Commission under Article 121(4) TFEU (b) or measures under Regulation 1466/
97, Regulation 1467/97 or Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011 (c).
The measures mentioned in (c) refer to a broad set of actions that the Commission and/or Council can undertake, ranging
from an invitation by the Council to adjust its stability programme (Regulation 1466/97, Article 5) to the instalment of a ﬁne
when the member state does not address its excessive deﬁcit (TFEU, Article 126, § 11; Regulation 1467/97). The assessment
of the Commission allows it to touch on the employment-oriented Country Speciﬁc Recommendations as well, as the
surveillance mechanism was adapted to have the employment guidelines incorporated under the Europe 2020-strategy.2826 This will become clearer when, as stated by Regulation 1176/2011, the MIP will be reviewed by the Commission. However an in-depth review of the
MIP has not been carried out yet. See Art. 16 Regulation 1176/2011. The application of the MIP was to be reviewed by the Commission not later than 14th of
December 2014. So far this has not been done yet.
27 Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, The Hellenic Republic, Spain, France, Italia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary,
Malta, The Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland And Sweden.
28 Although the member states were reluctant to transfer any further competence to the EU in the ﬁeld of employment, leading to some adaptations in
the surveillance mechanism itself. See more about this in (Mosher and Trubek, 2003, p. 67), see Article 1 Council Regulation No. 1466/97: in this provision,
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infractions of the employment-oriented Country Speciﬁc Recommendations has grown. However, as the sanctioning tools
have been designed on the basis of the Treaty provisions dealing with the economic monitoring process (mainly Article
121ff TFEU), employment guidelines should, in our opinion, have enough of an ‘economic character’ to justify the use of the
sanctioning powers of the aforementioned Regulations; i.e. in so far as they interact with the economic guidelines, use can
be made of the stronger surveillance mechanism. By incorporating social indicators under the MIP, although non-binding,
this link has been further strengthened.
The nature of the sanction is related to the kind of guidelines to be followed: ﬁnes can be imposed, for example, when
the behaviour of the (Eurozone) state endangers macro-economic imbalances. When the employment-oriented Country
Speciﬁc Recommendation is designed to address this imbalance, sanctions can be applied when the member states do not
follow up on this recommendation. However, if the employment-oriented recommendation has been developed merely
with a view to achieving a social objective, it remains out of the scope of the ‘sanctioning’ powers associated with the
economic monitoring process. Thus, there should be at least some connection to the economic balance guidelines under the
Europe 2020 strategy before the sanctioning tools come into play for employment-oriented Country Speciﬁc Recommen-
dations. If not, we remain within the naming and blaming approach that has traditionally been applied in monitoring social
and employment policies (through the OMC).
The concrete recommendations launched by the Council in the past four years, on the basis of the national reform
programmes submitted by the member states in the framework of the European Semester, can serve as a further illustration.4. The integrated approach applied in practice: the country-speciﬁc recommendations and the promotion of social
inclusion
In the previous section, we saw that the economic oriented recommendations can be enforced through the sanctioning
apparatus, introduced through the Six-Pack (MIP), SGP or the Two-Pack. In this last section, we will present some examples
of recommendations which relate to social inclusion in order to illustrate the legal effects of the integrated monitoring
approach. The question addressed in this part is this: What do the Country Speciﬁc Recommendations tell us about the
analysis in the previous section?
For several years now the Council has provided County Speciﬁc Recommendations on national reform programmes.
These national reform programmes are sent in as the (national) response to European deﬁned challenges. In the ﬁrst series
of examples, we take a closer look at the relation between social inclusion and employment. A key area to be addressed is
whether social inclusion recommendations are indeed deﬁned in an employment-related way, and if so, what the con-
sequences of such an approach are. Are the recommendations limited to employment-oriented social inclusion activities?
In a second and third series of examples, we focus on the social inclusion recommendations which are related to the
achievement of economic goals (4.2), as well as social (inclusion) goals (4.3). We will ask ourselves: What do the recom-
mendations in the second and third series of examples target? Are there recommendations that only support social
(inclusion) policies without referring to employment or economic policies? Do they go beyond the mere economic and
budgetary framework? And if so, what is their legal enforceability?
4.1. Promoting social inclusion as an employment guideline
The following examples are illustrative. The recommendation for Belgium (2015 and 2014)29 urges it to:(footno
we ﬁnd
broad e
29“Improve the functioning of the labour market by reducing ﬁnancial disincentives to work, increasing labour market
access for speciﬁc target groups and addressing skills shortages and mismatches” (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation
for Belgium, 2015).With regard to Denmark (2014 and 2013), there is also a clear link between employment and social inclusion. In the
(second) recommendation we can read that Denmark needs to take further measures to improve the employability of
people at the margins of the labour market” (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for Denmark, 2014 and 2013). In the
Country Speciﬁc recommendation of 2015, we see that this recommendation has not been repeated. The Commission
however refers to the labour market reform of 2014, which tries to improve the employability of people at the margins of
the labour market. For the Netherlands (2014 and 2013), the Council adopted a similar recommendation. In the recital the
Council explains that the current measures do not sufﬁce; further measures will have to be taken to improve the social
inclusion of persons at the margins of the labour market (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for the Netherlands, 2014,
2013).te continued)
that the budgetary targets in the stability and convergence programmes should explicitly take into account the measures adopted in line with the
conomic policy guidelines, as well as the guidelines for the employment policies of member states.
See also for a similar recommendation: Country Speciﬁc Recommendation 2013 Belgium.
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hand and employment on the other hand, urging Poland to complete the social assistance reform by adopting the relevant
legislation and strengthening its link with activation measures (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for Poland, 2013). Also,
Slovakia needs to strengthen the link between social inclusion policies, such as social assistance, and activation (2014). In
that respect, it should more effectively address long-term unemployment through activation measures, as well as second-
chance education and tailored quality training. Subsequently, Slovakia needs to enhance the capacity of public employment
services for case management, personalised counselling and the activation of jobseekers, and strengthen the link between
activation and social assistance (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for Slovakia, 2014). Latvia received a similar Country
Speciﬁc Recommendation in 201530 and Italy (2014) was also recommended to alleviate poverty through its employment
policy. For example, Italy needed to scale-up the pilot social assistance scheme in a ﬁscally neutral way, guaranteeing
appropriate targeting, strict conditionality and territorial uniformity, as well as strengthening the link with activation
measures (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for Italy, 2014).
Another illustration is the (fourth) recommendation for Hungary, requiring it to reorient the budget resources allocated
to the public work scheme to active labour market measures in order to foster integration into the primary labour market
(Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for Hungary, 2015). The labour market reform was also reviewed under the In-Depth
Review, which is part of the MIP. Consequently, this recommendation can be legally enforced. The In-Depth Review links the
recommendation regarding social inclusion to the level of unemployment in Hungary and the negative repercussions this
may have on the national budget:30
see als“The Public Works Scheme appears to be an inefﬁcient active labour market policy measure and distorts the proper
functioning of the labour market. It nominally reduces unemployment, but there is a risk, also from a budgetary point
of view, that public works of such a magnitude could entail signiﬁcant ‘lock-in’ effects and become a permanent
replacement for the system of welfare beneﬁts for the low-skilled” (In-depth Review for Hungary, 2015).In the Country Speciﬁc Recommendations of 2012, we can ﬁnd other links between social inclusion and employment.
The recommendation for Lithuania is perhaps the most salient example in this regard when it states:“[i]ncrease work incentives and strengthen the links between social assistance reform and activation measures, in
particular for the most vulnerable, to reduce poverty and social exclusion” (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for
Lithuania, 2012).In the recommendation addressed to the UK (2012), it was advised to facilitate labour market integration and further
ensure that “[p]lanned welfare reforms do not translate into increased child poverty”; and that ‘measures aiming to facilitate
access to childcare services’ should be fully implemented. In the recitals to this recommendation, we notice that a link is
made between employment and social inclusion when it is recalled that “the Government must take measures to ensure
that the positive impact of new policies on new employment and incomes will not be offset by declining amounts available
for beneﬁts, which would risk increasing poverty, particularly for families with children. […] The Government needs to take
steps to ensure that there is sufﬁcient access to childcare, in particular for low earners” (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation
for the United Kingdom, 2012) Similar to the Hungarian case, the recommendations for the United Kingdom (2012) were
part of the In-Depth Review under the MIP.
The Country Speciﬁc Recommendations thus demonstrate that the link between employment and social inclusion has
two dimensions: the framework for social inclusion may be employment-oriented; on the other hand, the restrictive
relation between employment and social exclusion also works the other way round: employment activation should not lead
to social exclusion. By doing so, the recommendation respects the wording of the tenth guideline which stipulates that,
through their employment policies, member states should promote social inclusion and combat poverty. Employment
policies with an adverse effect on poverty and social exclusion should be banned. Overall, however, the recommendations
also show that the Council is very careful when formulating policy advice in relation to the promotion of social inclusion; in
most cases it is done with a (direct or indirect) reference to employment.
4.2. Social inclusion recommendations: answering economic objectives
A considerable amount of recommendations regarding social inclusion are developed in relation to the promotion of a
sound national economy or budget. Several examples of this kind can be found in the Country Speciﬁc Recommendations.
The second recommendation for Belgium included the phrase: “Continue to improve the cost-efﬁciency of public
spending on long term institutional care” (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for Belgium, 2013). This recommendation to
Belgium was closely linked with the excessive deﬁcit procedure, under the MIP, allowing for sanctions when Belgium does
not reduce its budgetary deﬁcit. For the Czech Republic, the Council adopted similar recommendations both in 2014 as in
2013, urging it to take measures in order to signiﬁcantly improve the cost-effectiveness of healthcare expenditure, in
particular for hospital care (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for the Czech Republic, 2014, 2013). Romania needed toPortugal as well needed to ensure the effective action of beneﬁt recipients, as well as an adequate coverage of the minimum income scheme (2015)
o Country Speciﬁc Recommendation 2015 Portugal.
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and remote and isolated communities (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for Romania, 2014, 2013). Furthermore, Croatia
needed to tackle the ﬁscal risks in health care (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for Croatia, 2015).31 In that regard we see
that Finland (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for Finland, 2015) as well needed to ensure the effective design and
implementation of administrative reforms concerning the municipal structure and social and healthcare services, in order to
increase productivity and cost-effectiveness, whilst ensuring their quality. Looking at the recital (8), we see that Finland
needed to introduce an administrative reform in order to achieve the goals of the SGP. In this way, the recommendation
addressed to Finland can be enforced under the SGP.
Other examples are Estonia and Italy regarding family beneﬁts. Italy needed to improve the effectiveness of family
support schemes and quality services favouring low-income households with children (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation
for Italy, 2014, 2013). In relation to Estonia we read that it needs to increase the efﬁciency and cost-effectiveness of family
policy while improving the availability and accessibility of childcare (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for Estonia, 2014,
2013).
In most of these recommendations we can ﬁnd either in the recommendation itself or in its recital, a link to the national
economies and budgets of the member states. In this way, member states should reform or improve current social inclusion
policies in order to not put national economies and subsequently the national budgets at risk. When looking at the annex to
the Council decision on the guidelines for the employment policies, we see that this is not contrary to the legal mandate
under the tenth guideline. According to the annex, social inclusion policies cannot be to the detriment of ﬁnancial sus-
tainability: “although social security must be modernised, national systems must remain at the same time ﬁnancially
sustainable” (Council decision No. 2010/707/EU, Annex). However, developing social security recommendations that refer
purely to the implementation of social objectives is thus, not the primary goal of these Country Speciﬁc Recommendations.
4.3. Social inclusion recommendations for the sake of social objectives
Examples of recommendations focussing on the promotion of social objectives without referring to the support of
national employment and/or economic policies can also be found, but they are more restricted in number. From our sample
of the Country Speciﬁc Recommendations, it becomes clear that not every recommendation tries to achieve budgetary
sustainability or a higher employment rate in the member states. In this way, Croatia (Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for
Croatia, 2014) should strengthen the effectiveness and transparency of its social protection system. This should be done by
further consolidating beneﬁts, unifying eligibility criteria and linking data from all relevant levels and government entities
in a ‘one-stop shop’. Recital 16 provides more insight into this recommendation by stating that:31“high unemployment and low labour market participation have led to a deterioration of the social situation in Croatia.
The proportion of persons at risk of poverty and social exclusion has increased in recent years and is signiﬁcantly
above the EU average.… Despite several legislative reforms, since 2011, the design of the social beneﬁt systems failed
to effectively target people most in need.”No speciﬁc link is made to ﬁnancial sustainability of public ﬁnances, nor to the Croatian labour market policy. Yet this
recommendation does show a concrete link with social inclusion.
The Country Speciﬁc Recommendation of 2014 to Romania is also (mainly) focused on the eradication of poverty,
although we do ﬁnd a short reference to ‘strengthen the links with activation measures’. Romania should, in order to
alleviate poverty, increase the efﬁciency and effectiveness of social transfers, particularly for children and continue the
reform of the national social assistance scheme, strengthening its links with activation measures (Country Speciﬁc
Recommendation for Romania, 2014).
Although the recommendations refer to activation of the national social assistance scheme, it seems that the main
objective is the eradication of poverty. The recital provides some additional information:“Poverty reduction remains a major challenge. Despite the relatively stable employment situation, gross household
incomes have been declining and income inequalities have been growing. Families with children are particularly
exposed. There was only limited progress in speeding up the transition from institutional to alternative care for
children deprived of parental care. There is still a high number of persons with disabilities in large residential
institutions, while community services for the disabled are not sufﬁciently developed. The low take-up, coverage and
adequacy of social beneﬁts remain a challenge for the efﬁciency of social beneﬁts in reducing poverty…” (Country
Speciﬁc Recommendation for Romania, 2014).The main objective of this recommendation is thus not the achievement of employment or budgetary policies, but aims
at strengthening the national social inclusion policy.
Another example is the Country Speciﬁc Recommendation for Latvia (2013), urging it to tackle high rates of poverty by
reforming social assistance or better coverage, by improving beneﬁt adequacy and activation measures for beneﬁt recipients.
When looking at the consideration behind this recommendation, recital 12 states that:See also Country Speciﬁc Recommendation: 2015 Latvia and Country Speciﬁc Recommendation 2015 Lithuania.
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budget ﬁnancing of the beneﬁt. According to the Commission and the Council, these decisions are likely to aggravate
extreme poverty and exacerbate the existing inequality in access to social assistance across local governments, while
reducing central government incentives to invest in policy development and control of social assistance” (Country
Speciﬁc Recommendation for Latvia, 2013).Like the recommendation to Croatia, there is a call upon Latvia to not translate limited budgetary means into measures
that target the weakest groups in society in a negative manner (in particular the poor). More recent examples can be found
in the Country Speciﬁc Recommendations of 2015 where both Ireland, Portugal and Hungary needed to improve the ade-
quacy of social assistance or social beneﬁts. Nonetheless, in all three of them we ﬁnd an explicit link to activation measures
(employment objectives).
Apart from the recommendations to Latvia, Romania and Croatia, the majority of the social (inclusion) recommendations
have referred to national economies and budgets, as well as employment. They call for reform and improvement of current
social policies so that they do not put national economies and related ﬁscal budgets at risk. Developing social recom-
mendations that refer purely to the implementation of social objectives is not the primary goal of the integrated monitoring
process. Moreover, in cases where such recommendations are launched by the Council, they are not enforceable by the
means deployed by the surveillance mechanism of the integrated monitoring process; they lack the required link with
economic monitoring policy.5. Conclusions
Linking the guidelines on social inclusion to the employment guidelines ﬁrst and foremost has consequences when it
comes to the scope of action. The social inclusion recommendations discussed above were formulated mainly in terms of
employment integration or activation, and the existing Country Speciﬁc Recommendations are exemplary in this respect.
The narrowing down of the scope to employment-related actions is not surprising, given that the legal basis for the tenth
guideline is Article 148 TFEU (Employment Chapter). On the other hand, we can see from the analysis of the recommen-
dations that the link to social inclusion had an effect on the formulation of the employment guidelines as well; they should
not be to the detriment of social inclusion. Activation measures thus, should not lead to an increase in the number of
(working) people in poverty.
When it comes to the issue of enforceability, the relationship with the economic guidelines comes to the fore. Recom-
mendations can be enforced through sanctions if they relate to the economic guidelines, especially in relation to the
(budgetary) requirements for Eurozone member states. Thus, the Country Speciﬁc Recommendations formulated in the
national reform programmes often refer to national actions that should be undertaken in order to safeguard the national
economy and/or budget. Some of these actions relate to the social ﬁeld, among them reforms that have to be undertaken or
extended in relation to pensions, health care or poverty reduction schemes. The emphasis here is on ensuring the schemes’
efﬁciency and effectiveness, in order to avoid overburdening the economy or budget of the country. In relation to these
considerations, the social exclusion recommendations are an integral part of the economic guidelines; they address social
protection schemes in a ‘negative’ manner by referring to budgetary burdens or challenges to the national economy. Until
now, the tougher sanctioning apparatus is restricted to social (inclusion) guidelines of this nature. If there is no relationship
to the state of the economy, the enforceability of the recommendations remains in the sphere of ‘naming and blaming’.
‘Positive’ social recommendations (those which support social objectives) do not enjoy this strong form of legal
enforceability.
The integration of the social inclusions recommendation into the economic monitoring procedure also generates the
question to what extent the economic guidelines can work to the detriment of social inclusion. In line with Hinarejos (2012),
we should discern here (1) budgetary discipline and economic balance rules from (2) socioeconomic redistributive rules.
Budgetary discipline and balance rules are measures taken by member states in relation to annual deﬁcit and public debt.
On the other hand, socioeconomic redistributive rules are measures that revise the way in which public resources are
allocated by the member states, such as reforms in pension schemes and national health systems. The EU only has the
competence to impose the ﬁrst kind of measures, and still lacks a clear power to impose direct changes in socioeconomic
redistributive rules, at least in a ‘positive’ sense for the sake of the development of European social objectives.
The new monitoring mechanism of the Europe 2020 strategy and the European Semester does not change this starting
point. However, the two kinds of measures may become interlinked. When the EU imposes discipline and balance rules
which lay down ﬁscal objectives, the member states often have to fulﬁl these objectives through the (national) imple-
mentation of socioeconomic distribution rules. These measures are, however, aimed at supporting the ﬁnancial and eco-
nomic balances in the EU (member states) and may have a detrimental effect upon the level of social protection and the
ﬁght against social exclusion.
What if such measures at the national level were adopted in the application of European recommendations? Article 121
TFEU does not give an indication of how this relationship should be interpreted between national social inclusion policies
and national budgetary recommendations. Yet, if we want to ascribe a useful meaning to the recent integration of the social
(employment and social inclusion) monitoring process into the economic monitoring process, the relation should be
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on the employment and social exclusion outcomes. A ﬁrst reference to this approach can be found in the 2013 Country
Speciﬁc Recommendations to Latvia (see above).
Such an interpretation would give further concrete contents to the horizontal social clause (Article 9 TFEU). Article 9 TFEU
requires EU institutions to respect a high level of employment, adequate social protection, the ﬁght against social exclusion, a high
level of education and training, and protection of human health.32 Taking into account the general wording, one could advocate
the application of Article 9 TFEU to the guidelines developed in the socio-economic monitoring processes.
Such an approach would also pay the necessary respect to fundamental social rights, in particular the right to social
security and social assistance (Article 34 CFEU). Although neither Article 9 TFEU nor Article 34 CFEU gives direct competence
to the EU to take legal action, the main relevance of these clauses lies in the control of European measures on their (too)
adverse effect on the social acquis, including the European ﬁght against social exclusion. European measures which have an
adverse effect upon social inclusion should be kept to a minimum, and if still necessary, be kept to a minimum by excluding
the most vulnerable parts of the population from their scope.References
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